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9EcENT CASES
dental to an arrest without a warrant upon reasonable grounds may
well be a reasonable search even though no offense was in fact
committed in the officer's presence.
Neither the Kentucky Constitution nor the Kentucky Criminal
Code explicitly require the result reached in the instant case.13 Here
there may not have been an unreasonable search. The fact that the
defendant had not been tried on a preliminary charge of drunken driv-
ing might raise a presumption that the arrest was illegal until a con-
viction was had. Even if this presumption should arise, there is no
need to conclusively presume that the search incidental to the arrest
was an unreasonable search.
The admission of evidence procured in a search incidental to an
arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant should not depend upon
the defendant's being convicted of the offense for which he was
arrested. Such a rule may needlessly permit many criminals to escape
prosecution for serious felonies if they can obtain an acquittal
or dismissal of the preliminary charge. The question should be one
of the reasonableness of the search, as required by the constitution.
This would provide an accused adequate protection, and there is no
need for the Kentucky court to afford him a broader basis for
protection by equating unreasonable searches with searches inci-
dental to unlawful arrests.
Carl R. Clontz
DEDICATION OF STEETs-PEscmIroN-IGRTs OF ABUTTING PRoPERTY
OwNm-s-Martha Salyers and Marshall Tackett bought lots in a
platted subdivision on opposite sides of a street dedicated to the
public use by the subdivider in 1920. The street was outlined by
plowed furrows at the time of the dedication and had since grown
up in weeds and been used as pasture; it had never been used by
the public nor accepted by the town as a city street." Tackett erected
a building near the dead end of the street, fenced the street in, and
used it in connection with his adjoining land for cultivation and
pasture. In a suit by Salyers seeking an injunction to compel re-
13 "The constitutional provision does not undertake to define what consti-
tutes an unreasonable search and seizure, but it is judicially settled that all illegal
searches are 'unreasonable'." [Emphasis added.] Manning v. Commonwealth,
328 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Ky. 1959).
'The opinion suggests that the street in question was a city street, but
appellee's petition for rehearing and the court's application of the "County" section
of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.050 (see note 23, infra) make it obvious the street was
outside the city limits.
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moval of the obstructions and opening of the street, the trial court
held that Tackett was entitled to continued use by reason of his ad-
verse possession. Held: Reversed. Rights to obstruct a platted road
cannot be acquired by prescription without complying with Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes section 418.050(2),2 which requires that writ-
ten notice be given the county court before the statute of limitations
begins to run. Salyers v. Tackett, 322 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1958). 3
The basic question raised in this case is whether a lot owner, in
one of the unsuccessful subdivisions of the 1920's since grown up
in weeds and sparsely settled can, by fencing in a platted street
which was never improved nor used by the public, cut off the rights
of other lot owners and the public.
To answer this question it is first necessary to decide who ac-
quires rights in a street dedicated to the public by a subdivision plat.
There are three possibilities: the municipality (city or county), the
general public, and the purchasers of subdivision lots. The principal
case did not involve the rights of a municipality, as the street had
not been accepted by the county. The court held that the rights
were in the general public, although there had been no formal ac-
ceptance of the dedication and no user by the public. This holding
is supported by a line of cases4 represented by Burnett v. Henderson5
where the court said:
[W]here an owner lays out his land into building lots, streets,
and alleys, and exhibits a map thereof, and sells lots as bounded by
such streets or alleys, there is an immediate dedication of such streets
or alleys to the use of the purchasers and the public, though the
streets and alleys are not actually open, and though there has been
no acceptance by the municipality. [Emphasis added.]6
By construing the mere platting and sale of lots in a subdivision as
an immediate dedication of the streets therein, the Kentucky court
has departed from the common law rule that the general public
cannot acquire rights in a dedicated street without implied accept-
ance by user.7 This line of reasoning, if followed to its logical con-
clusion, would make it impossible for the subdivision owners to vacate
plats, because the rights of the public would vest permanently upon
2 See note 23 infra.
3 Rehearing denied May 1, 1959.
4 Burnett v. Henderson, 238 Ky. 431, 38 S.W.2d 262 (1931); Newport
Pressed Brick & Stone Co. v. Plummer, 149 Ky. 534, 149 S.W. 905 (1912);
Schneider v. Jacob, 86 Ky. 101, 5 S.W. 350 (1887). It is significant that in none
of these cases was the statute of limitations involved.
5 238 Ky. 431, 38 S.W.2d 262 (1931).
6 Id. at 432, 38 S.W.2d at 263.
7 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 33.43, 33.50 (3d ed. 1950); 4
Tiffany, Real Property § 1107 (3d ed. 1939).
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the offer of dedication. An owner of all the lots in a subdivision
could not extinguish the public easement so as to cultivate or im-
prove the land as he saw fit.
These cases speak of a dedication made "to the use of the
abutting lot owners and the publc,"8 thus confusing the public at
large with subdivision purchasers. But technically, there can be no
dedication to private persons.9 Other states recognize a distinction
between the rights acquired by the general public through a dedica-
tion effected by platting and sale, followed by acceptance or user,
and private rights acquired by grantees by virtue of the grant or
covenant contained in a deed which refers to a plat.10 The bare fact
that a dedication is made by plat does not make the municipality a
trustee'1 for the private rights of all owners in the subdivision. The
abutting lot owner, by reason of his location, merely acquires an ease-
ment of ingress and egress, no different from the right of access
appurtenant to all property bordering public streets.' 2 It is a private
contract right entirely independent of any rights the owner may have
as a member of the general public.13
It was this private right which Salyers sued to protect in the in-
stant case.14 Such property rights may be defeated by prescription. 15
This precise point was recently considered by the South Carolina
court'0 in a similar case between lot owners. The parties conceded
that a private easement may be lost by adverse possession (prescrip-
tion), but they could not agree as to whether the easement of abut-
ting lot owners was private or public. The defendant claimed that
the street had never been open to the plaintiff or the public, but
the issue was never put to the jury. The trial court held that there
had been a dedication to the public, although the street had not been
accepted, and that title to the street could not be acquired by ad-
verse possession. The state supreme court remanded the case for a
8 Burnett v. Henderson, supra note 6.
911 MeQuillin, op. cit. supra note 7, § 33.24; 4 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note
7, § 1103.
103 Dillon, Municipal Co orations § 1090, at 1739 (5th ed. 1911).
The municipality is said to hold all public property rights, e.g., a dedi-
cated easement, as trustee for the general public. See 11 Ky. L. J. 242 (1923).
1. 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 9.12 (1958).
13 Dulany v. Bishoff, 165 Pa. Super. 207, 67 A.2d 600 (1949); 3 Tiffany,
op. cit. supra note 7, § 800.
14 The court first determined that the easement was in the purchasers on
the ground of their reliance, but in the next paragraph it reversed its field and
held the easement to be in "the public, particularly contiguous property owners."
The court further said that this right 'cannot be destroyed by mere encroach-
ment by the owner of abutting property." 322 S.W.2d at 709. But in support
of this last statement, the court cited 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 54 (1956), which
deals solely with public rights.
15 2 American Law of Property § 8.102 (1952).
16 Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 71, S.E.2d 509 (1952).
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determination of the facts-whether there had been an acceptance
by the public-saying, "Ve think the court below erred in assuming
that the easmeent was a public one. The facts alleged in the answer
tend to show a private easement which may be lost by adverse
possession."'7
The rights of abutting property owners were last properly an-
alyzed by the Kentucky court in a 1916 case, Home Laundry Co. v.
City of Louisville.'8 There the court maneuvered around an unac-
cepted dedication to find an easement in the city by prescription.
The plaintiff had purchased land with an adjoining street shown on
the plat, but the city was allowed to defeat its easement by adverse
user. The court said:
The peculiar rights of an abutting property owner to the use of a
street for ingress and egress to and from the property . . . is a
private right [sic] of his own, and one not shared by the public with
him, and the municipality does not hold such right as a trustee for
him. Hence it is a right .which he may lose by adverse user .... 19
Since private property rights are not immune to adverse posses-
sion, the court in the principal case had to conclude that the rights
were in the public if it were to reach its desired result. Assuming,
arguendo, that the easement was in the public at large-should the
sovereign immunity from limitations be extended to this unascertain-
able mass of people as distinguished from the representative munici-
pal government? At common law, time did not run against the gov-
ernment due to the operation of the maxim-nullum tempus occurrit
regi.20 The modern justification for this doctrine is the public policy
of preserving public rights and property from damage and loss
through the negligence of public officials.21 But this rationale does not
equally apply to the public at large which does not itself engage in
governmental functions and which has no collective voice to assert
or waive immunity. In the case of a dedication made to the general
public, there is no concern about negligent and incompetent of-
ficials; acceptance depends upon public user, not upon official acts.
22
The statute invoked by the plaintiff in the principal case requires
notice to the county before time begins to run in favor of an adverse
17 71 S.E.2d at 512.
18 168 Ky. 499, 182 S.W. 645 (1916).
19 Id. at 509, 182 S.W. at 650.2 0 Note, "Real Property-Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi," 24 Kansas City
L. Rev. 187 (1955).
211d. at 195; See also Scarborough, "Prescription Rights Against Munici-
palities in Kentucky," 12 Ky. L. J. 68 (1923).
22 11 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 83.47, 33.48, 33.50; 6 Powell, Real
Property f 935 (1958).
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possessor of a public road. 3 The court held that the prerequisite of
notice applies to easements in the public at large as well as to ease-
ments in the municipality. The effect of this decision may well be
that land, once dedicated to the public use, might stand idle in-
definitely if not used by the public. Where the public acquires a
right of way by prescription over private land and then ceases to
use it, the owner could forever be enjoined from obstructing the
way. Although a street dedicated in 1920 had not been used by the
public for over thirty years, the court here said, "But it was and
is a public road in the sense that the dedication inured to the benefit
of the public.... This right cannot be destroyed by mere encroach-
ment by the owner of abutting property." [Emphasis added.]2 4
The application of the statute here is inconsistent with its inter-
pretation in City of Latonia v. Latonia Agricultural Association,25
where the "county" section of the statute26 and its "city" counterpart 27
were considered together:
It will be observed that the operation of the first of the foregoing
sections is limited to the right of a municipality to bring an action
to recover the use of a street, alley, or other public easement in the
city. To meet the requirements of the statute, the easements must
exist as public highways, and must be in the city during the period
of adverse holding in order to prevent the statute from running; and,
under the provisions of the second section above quoted, the road
must exist as a public highway of the county while being adversely
held to stop the statute from running against the county. The object
of both sections is clearly to prevent the secret appropriation of
public highways by adverse possession.
28
The court went on to say that in the absence of an acceptance, the
dedication was ineffectual and the streets in question were not tech-
nically highways, so adverse possession for the statutory period
barred the city's rights to accept and open them.29 If a municipality's
rights arising from an unaccepted offer of dedication may be extin-
guished by adverse user, a fortiori, the rights of the general public
under a dedication not followed by user should be susceptible to
prescription.
2 3 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.050(2) provides:
Limitation shall not begin to run in favor of any person in the pos-
session of any part of any public road until written notice is given
to the county court of the county in which the road is situated that
the possession is adverse to the right of the public to the use of
the road.
24 322 S.W.2d at 709.
25 139 Ky. 732, 109 S.W. 356 (1908).
20 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.050(2).
2 7 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.050(1).
28139 Ky. at 735-6, 109 S.W. at 357-8.
20139 Ky. at 737-8, 109 S.W. at 358.
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CONCLUSION
Land is one of man's most valuable possessions; it was made to
be occupied and exploited, not to lie in waste. To this end, adverse
possession is a useful tool. The justification for governmental im-
munity to limitations is perhaps still valid. But it is doubtful that
the general public is entitled to the protection of that immunity. And
certainly time should run against all private property rights, regard-
less how acquired. It is inescapable that private interests were al-
lowed to avail themselves of governmental immunity in the principal
case. None of the reasons for conferring immunity on public entities,
or even the public at large, apply to private land owners. The public
interest in dedicated streets should not be used to shield private
interests from prescription. Rights in public land can be acquired
by adverse use against all third persons, including abutting property
owners, without regard to whether rights are acquired against the
public.30 The statute has been misapplied by the Kentucky court, and
an unprecedented limitation has been placed upon the law of ad-
verse possession.
Robert G. Zweigart
BREAL POPuRTY-ADvHESE POSSESSION OF ADJOINING LAND BY A Co-
TENANT IN POSSESSION INuREs TO Tm BENE OF Co-TENANT OUJT
oF PossEssioN-In 1953 plaintiff brought this action to quiet title against
defendant Helton. Defendant asserted title by adverse possession
based on a tacking of the adverse possession of George Calvin, one
of his predecessors in title. Prior to 1897 plaintiff's predecessor in title
held a tract of sixteen hundred acres which adjoined a five-hundred
acre tract held by Vint Calvin. In 1897 Vint Calvin died and his tract
passed to several children, one of whom was George Calvin. George
Calvin and his children occupied the tract until 1938, when the Vint
Calvin heirs deeded the land to trustees. In 1942 the trustees deeded
a sixty-acre tract to Helton. This tract, which had been fenced and
cultivated by the Calvins for forty years, included two and one-half
acres lying within plaintiffs tract and adjoining the Calvin tract.
The Calvin children were tenants-in-common, but only one of them,
George Calvin, was in actual possession. Plaintiff contended that the
adverse possession of George Calvin was personal in nature and did
80 11 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 7, § 30.180; Cf. Tarpey v. Madsen, 178
U. S. 215, 220-1 (1900).
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